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Abstract
This thesis explores the use of graph embedding methods for compiler provenance
identification. Graph embedding algorithms are widely used to analyze, compare, or
distinguish networks, or similar structures, that are too large to represent visually.
Using graph embeddings to address the problem of compiler provenance identifica-
tion is a novel approach. Our approach applies embedding algorithms to the control
flow graphs of binaries. In this document, we explore two graph embedding methods:
tiered approaches and alternative embedding representations for analysis. Our results
indicate that our method has the potential for use in compiler provenance identifica-
tion. Experiments show that our approach is able to distinguish between individual
compilers, compiler versions, and compiler version flags with above-average accu-
racy. Future work may explore extracting the significant graph embeddings from our
generated model, recreate the generalized graph from the embeddings, and identify
significant structures for manual analysis.
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1 Introduction
Reverse engineering software takes a finalized application, disassembles it, and in-
spects its parts to learn more about the architecture, coding style, authorship, or its
functionality. This often requires that the individual attempting to reverse engineer
has incredibly detailed knowledge on a myriad of subjects including, but not lim-
ited to: operating systems, compiler design, programming, architecture design, and
programming languages. Often, reverse engineers attempt to redevelop the original
source from the machine code, but this is difficult due to the compilation process that
produces an application. Compilation takes source code and converts it to machine
code, removing information useful to humans, such as syntax, names, or comments.
Further complicating the process is the fact that individuals compiling software can
obfuscate or maliciously change their application to hide information so that reverse
engineering is much more difficult. Thus, it is important to have tools that can aid
an individual in the task of reverse engineering by identifying information that would
be helpful for proper reverse engineering.
To effectively reverse engineer an application, an engineer needs to know what
computer architecture the application was built for, the compiler used, its version,
and potentially the optimizations used during compilation. Collectively these are
referred to as compiler provenance features and they are extremely important due
to the compounding effect that misidentifying these features may have. Extracting
compiler provenance from an application is done using heuristics, pre-built models,
signatures, or other patterns that identify specific features in an application that
1
indicate some element of the application’s compiler provenance. An engineer may
make use of tools that contain databases of these signatures in order to present the
most likely compiler provenance features. However, signatures are not always accurate
and can present false positives.
Misidentifying any one of these features can lead to the inability to successfully
apply various binary analysis techniques (Rahimian et al. 2015). As mentioned above,
compilation is a one-way process; to undo it, reverse engineers make the best guess of
compiler provenance features to accurately disassemble and interpret the underlying
machine code. Any conclusions drawn from incorrectly reverse engineered programs
may be incorrect because they are based on false premises; machine code can differ
drastically from any compiler, version, or optimization made. Thus, it is critical for
compiler provenance extraction and identification to be accurate.
This thesis presents a novel and generalized approach to compiler provenance iden-
tification. This work takes approaches found in similar research done by R. Wang
et al. 2017 and S. Wang, P. Wang, and Wu 2016 in disassembly and control flow
graph (CFG) construction. Unlike prior works, our work uses a low dimensional rep-
resentation of CFGs, namely graph embeddings, for compiler provenance detection.
In short, we use simple disassembly methods to develop CFGs and run two separate
graph embedding algorithms against the developed graphs. Graph embeddings, which
reduce the high dimensionality of large graphs into lower dimensional representation,
are applied to the CFGs which can then be used for classifcation. Once gathered,
the graph embeddings are run through a a machine learning classifier for compiler
provenance prediction.
In the rest of this paper we will discuss the related works, implementation, and
results of our experiments.
2
2 Related Works
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Compiler Provenance
Compiler provenance is a term that encompasses many details of the compiler used
to create a particular binary: the compiler family, version, optimization levels, and
related functions (Rahimian et al. 2015). These features are pivotal for understanding
a binary and its results. However, extraction of this information can be very difficult
due to the asymmetrical nature of a compiler.
Compilers take source code, written in higher level languages, and convert them
into machine code. The equivalent machine code is generated using specific rules.
This process of compilation is a one way transmutation, as much of the information
that makes source code easy for humans to debug is stripped away. As such, reading
machine code is difficult due to the lack of user defined variable names, offsets, and
branching that may have occurred in the source code. When reading machine code
it is also important to note that sections of relevant data are intermixed with other
information, making it impossible to read linearly. Additionally, branching factors
such as function calls, switches, and obfuscation techniques may change offsets and
other sections of information. Finally, machine code often makes use of libraries which
are accessed through the linker; linking allows a program to make calls to other
functions that are not stored in the binary itself, further obfuscating the process.
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Figure 2.1: Compiler source to
machine code translation
Compiler provenance allows a reverse engineer
the ability to distinguish bits of machine code as
compiler-specific or not. Compiler specific machine
code is assembly code generated from a given set of
rules such as loop unpacking, encryption algorithms,
and other special cases, knowing which compiler gen-
erated the machine code allows a reverse engineer to
quickly pinpoint and discard unnecessary machine
code that won’t aid in their task. Compiler fam-
ily (gcc, clang, etc.) and versions (gcc-5, clang-6,
etc.) allow an engineer to understand what compiler
instructions will be generated (Kru¨gel et al. 2004).
Optimization level allows an engineer to understand
and find common patterns generated when optimiz-
ing machine code. These all allow for an accurate
recreation of a binary’s source. Without exact ex-
traction of this information, accurate reproduction
of any source becomes impossible. Thus it is impor-
tant for reverse engineers to be able to gather this
information.
In the past decade there have been few notable
studies such as early work done by Jacobson, N. Rosenblum, and Miller 2011, “La-
belling Library Functions in Stripped Binaries”, which focuses only on semantic de-
scriptors and highlights modern issues in compiler provenance extraction such as:
lack of types, expressive syntax, comments, formatting, and compiler transforma-
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tions (Jacobson, N. Rosenblum, and Miller 2011). Semantic descriptors are later
expanded upon and used in works by Rosenblum’s, Miller’s, and Zhun’s work. These
descriptors are used in identifying function entry points, another common issue when
dealing with compiler provenance extraction.
“Extracting Compiler Provenance in Stripped Binaries” by Rosenblum, Miller,
and Zhun (ECP), takes an N-Gram like approach to feature extraction. Commonly
used in Natural Language Processing, N-grams look at surrounding neighbors and
develops pairs or sequences of words. ECP uses an improved N-gram-like approach
which they refer to as “idioms”. Idioms are developed by taking short sequences of
instructions and optional wildcards (N. E. Rosenblum, Miller, and Zhu n.d.). Idioms
are extremely useful because they capture instruction patterns, which can be related
back to bytes in the binaries themselves.
BinComp is the most recent approach to compiler provenance extraction, and in
contrast to its predecessors, takes a more comprehensive approach to feature extrac-
tion. BinComp breaks the problem into three layers: syntax extraction, compiler
function features, and semantic features (Rahimian et al. 2015). This approach relies
on a large dataset containing source, binary, and all intermediary files produced dur-
ing compilation. This process results in a robust data set, improving overall accuracy
(Rahimian et al. 2015).
2.1.2 Static Analysis
Disassembly is a fundamental component of both reverse engineering and com-
piler provenance identification. Disassembly is incredibly difficult due to the many
improvements made to compilers, and obfuscation techniques. Failure to disassem-
ble target binaries correctly may result in a cascading series of problems. Problems
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during disassembly can result in inaccurate code reproduction, error prone patching,
misclassification of code while wasting large amounts of time. There have been exten-
sive efforts in creating tools that have high accuracy when identifying these features
for disassembly.
These tools are referred to as disassemblers, and there are a plethora of tools
available for use, such as: IDA Pro (Hex-Rays 2019), Binary Ninja (Vector-35 2019),
Radare2 (R. Wang et al. 2017), and Ghidra (NSA 2019). These tools utilize metadata
included in target binaries to aid in their task. Others have developed signatures that
can aid in the accuracy of the disassembly as well. However, one of the most basic
features of any disassembler is to provide a dump of instructions included in the
target.
There are two main approaches when disassembling binaries: Linear Sweep and
Recursive Traversal (R. Wang et al. 2017). Linear sweep starts with the first byte of
the target’s text section and begins disassembly from that byte (Kru¨gel et al. 2004).
There are downsides to this approach; one such issue is the inability to distinguish
non-data sections from data (Kru¨gel et al. 2004). Recursive traversal avoids this
problem by following addresses available in disassembly that affect control flow. The
recursive approach then begins disassembling from these new addresses (Meng and
Miller 2016). The recursive approach is more likely to avoid missing sections of code
as it will iterate over sections more than once, however, it has its own set of problems.
Such problems come in the form of effectiveness, efficiency, and the implementation
of the recursive method. As a recursive method by definition goes through the code
multiple times until it has seen all possible addresses there is the issue of potentially
accessing areas of memory that are not strictly machine code. This can lead to further
disassembly of invalid sections of memory, which can compound into a completely
irrelevant disassembly of the application. Furthermore, while linear methods are
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simple and start inside the start point of the application, recursive methods will be
much more likely to fall victim to obfuscation techniques, simply because obfuscation
techniques often edit control flow, names, or simply add code which can make recursive
disassembly less effective. As mentioned, obfuscation techniques can be used to limit
the efficacy of both recursive and linear methods (Kru¨gel et al. 2004). However,
recursive methods are much more likely to suffer due to their multiple passes through
the machine code. Linear and recursive methods are not binary however, and it
is often the case that they are used in conjunction to more effectively disassemble
binaries. Finally, it is worth mentioning that obfuscation can be overcome, however,
the methods to do so are often much more involved than simple linear or recursive
methods (Schwarz, S. Debray, and G. Andrews 2002).
A sufficiently skilled and committed individual will eventually reverse engineer
their target. However, obfuscation techniques are often used to inhibit and deter
potentially malicious individuals from reverse engineering a given program (Popov,
S. K. Debray, and G. R. Andrews 2007). Obfuscation techniques have been created to
hinder a variety of approaches to reverse engineering(Hosseinzadeh et al. 2018): Lay-
out obfuscation randomly adjusts the source code in an attempt to make disassembly
difficult ( Figure 2.4,Figure 2.2,Figure 2.3) (ioccc 2019, Hosseinzadeh et al. 2018,
Popov, S. K. Debray, and G. R. Andrews 2007). Control flow obfuscation changes
the control flow of the program into a convoluted mess (Figure 2.5 Figure 2.6) (Hos-
seinzadeh et al. 2018, Popov, S. K. Debray, and G. R. Andrews 2007). Finally, data
obfuscation hides data structures, types, and variables in a program (Figure 2.4,Fig-
ure 2.7) (Hosseinzadeh et al. 2018, Popov, S. K. Debray, and G. R. Andrews 2007).
Data and layout obfuscation may seem similar, however layout obfuscation focuses on
source code while data obfuscation seeks to obscure the function calls in both source
and the underlying disassembly that it produces.
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1 #inc lude <s t d i o . h>
2 i n t some math ( i n t a , i n t b) {
3 i n t c = 8 ;
4 i n t d = a ∗ c ;
5 p r i n t f ( ”%d” , d) ;
6 d = d / b ;
7 re turn d ;
8 }
Figure 2.2: Program
Simple C program that takes in two values and does some basic arithmetic. Layout obfusca-
tion is much more effective with more information, hence the addition of more instructions
as compared to the hello world program shown below in Figure 2.4
1 #inc lude <s t d i o . h>
2 i n t o 252b41c8d82534efa339ce5a5eb167c8 ( i n t
o 8a65c6831e60fcc93ace8d2548a45b0f , i n t
o 12c4c5ddbecbe57d3259e214258eb0e3 ) { i n t
o 4ce9740e66b227d830a07ac04db2216d=(0x0000000000000010 + 0
x0000000000000208 + 0 x0000000000000808 − 0x0000000000000A18 )
; i n t o 631bd8e30e3054c3d26bf21e78ee6f60=
o 8a65c6831e60fcc93ace8d2548a45b0f ∗
o 4ce9740e66b227d830a07ac04db2216d ; p r i n t f ( ”\x25””d” ,
o 631bd8e30e3054c3d26bf21e78ee6f60 ) ;
o 631bd8e30e3054c3d26bf21e78ee6f60 =
o 631bd8e30e3054c3d26bf21e78ee6f60 /
o 12c4c5ddbecbe57d3259e214258eb0e3 ; r e turn
o 631bd8e30e3054c3d26bf21e78ee6f60 ; } ;
Figure 2.3: Layout obfuscation
Example of layout obfuscation applied to code in Figure 2.2. As mentioned the variable are
the only layer affected, meaning with some small amount of effort one could translate this
back to its more readable format.
Obfuscation techniques present a difficult problem for reverse engineers. If done
well, these techniques can be stealthy, avoiding detection by manual inspections
(Popov, S. K. Debray, and G. R. Andrews 2007). Regardless, there is a trade-off
between obfuscation effectiveness and run time as obfuscation generally increases run
time (Behera and Bhaskari 2015). Inevitably, this trade-off prevents obfuscation tech-
niques from becoming too much of a burden for reverse engineers. In addition to this
trade-off, the modification of underlying binary code can tip off engineers to the use
8
1 #inc lude <s t d i o . h>
2 i n t main ( ) {
3 p r i n t f ( ” He l lo World ! ” ) ;
4 }
Figure 2.4: Hello World C
Simple hello world program written in C for use in illustrating the obfuscation techniques
shown in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.5: Hello World Disassembly
Unobfuscated disassembly of hello world program shown in Figure 2.4. Using the IDA
disassembler to show what the main program is translated to.
of obfuscation techniques (Taylor 2017). Automated scanners are regularly used to
increase the efficiency of reverse engineering, they can also be used to detect obfusca-
tion techniques and flag them for manual inspection. Obfuscation techniques cannot
prevent reverse engineering; they only increase the time and effort required of the
reverse engineers.
As is often the case, reverse engineers use a mix of techniques when taking apart
a binary. Rarely are engineers left with just binary disassembly to review. Often,
their tools, such as disassemblers, provide a suite of techniques and representations
9
Figure 2.6: Hello World Obfuscated
Obfuscation of the hello world program shown in figure Figure 2.4. This illustrates an
example of control flow obfuscation, translating what would look like Figure 2.5 and making
it much more convoluted.
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1 #inc lude ” s t d i o . h”
2 ( , 0 , O , ) {(O < 0 ) ? p r i n t f ( ”%c” , ( O ==2)
3 | | ( O ==3) | | ( O ==9)? ++,O ++ ,108:∗(( i n t ∗)
4 +O ++− ) ) , ( , 0 , O , ) : 0 ; }main ( ) { i n t array
5 [ ]={72 , ’ e ’ ,111 ,040 ,0127 ,0 x6F , ’ r ’ ,0 x64 ,041 } ; ( array , 1 2 , 0 , 0 ) ;}
Figure 2.7: Data obfuscation
Example of data obfuscation applied to the code found in Figure 2.2. Similar to the layout
obfuscation technique shown in Figure 2.3, this has the added effect of altering how the
data is referenced in the assembly.
that can be applied to a given binary (Hex-Rays 2019). One such representation
provided are Control Flow Graphs (CFG) which visualize the underlying control flow
of the disassembly (Xu, Sun, and Su 2010). This visualization is ideal for manual and
automated analysis due to the strict rules associated with CFG construction. Such
analysis can be used in areas outside of reverse engineering such as generating test
cases (Gotlieb, Botella, and Rueher 1998), finding software bugs (Bonfante, Kacz-
marek, and Marion 2007), and program verification (Gotlieb, Botella, and Rueher
1998). In addition to these methods, CFGs can be used to identify algorithms and
data structures, allowing reverse engineers to easily identify possible areas of interest
(Mikhailov et al. 2016).
2.1.3 Graph Embeddings
Graph embeddings are a product of graph analysis techniques that aim to reduce
the dimensionality of graphs down to a set of one or more vectors (Ou et al. 2016).
These embeddings have many practical uses for representing graphs that may be
useful in graph analytics such as node classification, link prediction, clustering, and
visualization (Goyal and Ferrara 2017). Node classification can help us categorize
nodes based off others in a graph. Link prediction focuses on accurately predicting
future connections in a more dynamic graph. Clustering, similar to node classifi-
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cation, looks to group nodes based off various information. Finally, visualization is
an attempt to simplify graphs into a format which we can extract more information
from.
A recent survey developed a taxonomy of methods for graph embeddings. Accord-
ing to them (Goyal and Ferrara 2017) factorization based methods represent graphs as
a matrix of node connections to obtain an embedding, but these methods do not learn
structural equivalence unless included explicitly (Goyal and Ferrara 2017). Random
walk based methods take partial representation of graphs via random walks, in order
to represent the overall larger graph, which can model a variety of functions depend-
ing on their parameters (Goyal and Ferrara 2017). Finally, deep learning methods
look at applying autoencoders to capture non-linear structures and can model a large
variety of functions (Goyal and Ferrara 2017). Each of these methods focuses on
extracting a representation of the N-dimensional graphs such that we can represent
them in other ways. Each of the methods (Factorization, Random Walk, and Deep
Learning) will produce different results and their use is dependant on the type of data
being processed.
Graph embedding take highly dimensional graph data and create a lower dimen-
sional representation called an embedding. For example, Figure 2.8 provides us with
a snippet of a CFG. There are no weights or other information, outside of neigh-
boring nodes, that can be used for tasks outlined above. HOPE is an algorithm
developed by Ou et al. 2016, which focuses on preserving higher-order proximity in
graph embeddings and is an example of a factorization based method. Order refers
to the number of vertices used to represent the substructure, thus HOPE seeks to
use more vertices to improve the embeddings it produces. Figure 2.9 illustrates the
use of the HOPE algorithm to embed a directed graph such as in Figure 2.8 into a
2D space. Random walk based methods such as Node2Vec take a different approach.
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Figure 2.8: Control Flow Graph
Control flow graphs (CFG) are one way to visualize a programs function. This image
illustrates an example of the CFG that we will use. Each node in the graph corresponds to
a basic block which is contiguous sets of instructions which may hold a branching instruction
at the end. The links correspond to the branching instructions that may be at the end of
the block which points to the next block for exectuion.
Unlike HOPE, Node2Vec uses random walks from all nodes such that it can develop
its embedding(Grover and Leskovec 2016). An example of Node2Vec run against the
same graph as HOPE can be seen in Figure 2.10. Deep learning methods take a
similar approach to machine learning methods of the same name with many hidden
layers. For our purposes we decided to focus on the more direct methods of graph
embeddings for our project.
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Figure 2.9: HOPE
This figure is an example of the resulting lower dimensional embedding using HOPE applied
to a graph similar to Figure 2.8. This resulting embedding is the same one we use in the
following approach discussed further in this paper.
Figure 2.10: Node2Vec
This figure is an example of the resulting lower dimensional embedding using Node2Vec
applied to a graph similar to Figure 2.8. This resulting embedding is the same one we use
in the following approach discussed further in this paper.
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3 Implementation
In this section we will discuss the implementation of our experiments. In this
paper we take two different embedding algorithms and apply them to our generated
CFGs: Node2Vec and HOPE. These methods allow us to contrast the effectiveness of
two seperate graph embeddings approaches: Random Walk and Factorization. Fur-
thermore, we use three methods for the experiments below: Tiered, Non-Tiered, and
Average Length Padding. Tiered assumes prior knowledge while Non-Tiered does not.
Average Length Padding, which is used in both a Tiered and Non-Tiered approach,
truncates embeddings for optimization efforts. The following section discusses the
implementation of these experiments.
3.0.1 Disassembly
Prior to the analysis, we disassemble a binary in order to generate the data for
the various appraoches: Tiered, Non-Tiered, Node2Vec, and Average Length Padding.
We make use of a lightweight Python module for disassembly, “capstone,” 1 allowing
us to have more fine-grain control over how we disassemble a binary. In our approach,
we focus on disassembling only from the entry point, found in the ELF headers
Figure 3.1, and subsequent addresses that we may find. In order to guarantee that
we disassemble correctly, we must also determine the offset used for a given binary.
The offset allows a binary to keep track of its alignment in memory, this is important
1https://www.capstone-engine.org/langpython.html
15
1 ELF Header :
2 Magic : 7 f 45 4c 46 02 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
3 Class : ELF64
4 Data : 2 s complement , l i t t l e endian
5 Vers ion : 1 ( cur rent )
6 OS/ABI : UNIX − System V
7 ABI Vers ion : 0
8 Type : EXEC ( Executable f i l e )
9 Machine : Advanced Micro Devices X86−64
10 Vers ion : 0x1
11 Entry point address : 0x4049a0
12 Star t o f program headers : 64 ( bytes in to f i l e )
13 Star t o f s e c t i on headers : 124728 ( bytes in to f i l e )
14 Flags : 0x0
15 S i z e o f t h i s header : 64 ( bytes )
16 S i z e o f program headers : 56 ( bytes )
17 Number o f program headers : 9
18 S i z e o f s e c t i on headers : 64 ( bytes )
19 Number o f s e c t i on headers : 29
20 Sect ion header s t r i n g tab l e index : 28
Figure 3.1: ELF Headers
Elf Headers are found in the beginning bytes of every ELF program. This information is
necessary for the execution of the program and also dictates what size addresses will be
used. For our purposes we extract the entry point address to begin our disassembly.
1 Program Headers :
2 Type Of f s e t VirtAddr PhysAddr
3 F i l e S i z MemSiz Flags Align
4 PHDR 0x0000000000000040 0x0000000000400040 0x0000000000400040
5 0x00000000000001f8 0 x00000000000001f8 R E 8
6 INTERP 0x0000000000000238 0x0000000000400238 0x0000000000400238
7 0x000000000000001c 0x000000000000001c R 1
8 [ Request ing program i n t e r p r e t e r : / l i b 6 4 / ld−l inux−x86−64. so . 2 ]
9 LOAD 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000400000 0x0000000000400000
10 0x000000000001da64 0x000000000001da64 R E 200000
11 LOAD 0x000000000001de00 0x000000000061de00 0x000000000061de00
12 0x0000000000000800 0x0000000000001568 RW 200000
13 DYNAMIC 0x000000000001de18 0x000000000061de18 0x000000000061de18
14 0x00000000000001e0 0x00000000000001e0 RW 8
15 NOTE 0x0000000000000254 0x0000000000400254 0x0000000000400254
16 0x0000000000000044 0x0000000000000044 R 4
17 GNU EH FRAME 0x000000000001a5f4 0 x000000000041a5f4 0 x000000000041a5f4
18 0x0000000000000804 0x0000000000000804 R 4
19 GNU STACK 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
20 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 RW 10
21 GNU RELRO 0x000000000001de00 0x000000000061de00 0x000000000061de00
22 0x0000000000000200 0x0000000000000200 R 1
Figure 3.2: Program Headers
Program Headers follow the ELF headers and dictate how the binary will be mapped in
memory. Of note are the two included LOAD sections. Once a program is mapped to
memory it is split into multiple mappings so that certain areas may be READ ONLY.
as a binary will not be loaded into the same space in memory every time. This
information can be determined from the information found in the program headers
Figure 4.1. Once we extract these individual pieces we can begin to disassemble from
the entry point, allowing us to build the CFG.
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1 ;−− r i p :
2 / ( fcn ) entry0 42
3 | entry0 ( ) ;
4 | 0x004049a0 31ed xor ebp , ebp
5 | 0x004049a2 4989d1 mov r9 , rdx
6 | 0x004049a5 5e pop r s i
7 | 0x004049a6 4889 e2 mov rdx , rsp
8 | 0x004049a9 4883 e4 f0 and rsp , 0 x f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f 0
9 | 0x004049ad 50 push rax
10 | 0x004049ae 54 push rsp
11 | 0 x004049af 49 c7c0203c41 . mov r8 , 0x413c20 ; ’ <A’
12 | 0x004049b6 48 c7c1b03b41 . mov rcx , 0x413bb0
13 | 0x004049bd 48 c7c7002a40 . mov rdi , main ; s e c t i on . . t ext ; 0
x402a00 ; ”AWAVAUATUS\x89\xfbH\x89\xf5H\x81\xec\x88\x03”
14 | 0x004049c4 e 8 7 7 d c f f f f c a l l sym . imp . l i b c s t a r t ma i n
15 \ 0x004049c9 f4 h l t
Figure 3.3: Basic Block
The above shows disassembly shows one basic block. A basic blocked contains one entry
point, the first instruction of the block, and can only exit at the end. In this basic block
there are no branches after the last instruction, this results in a leaf node in a control flow
graph which visualizes the basic block connections.
3.0.2 Control Flow Graph
CFGs are an important tool for the analysis of the control flow of a binary and its
utilization. Our approach takes the disassembly from the first step and builds simple
basic blocks from them. Basic blocks contain all instructions between branching
instructions; each node in our graph represents one basic block. A small result of our
CFG generation can be seen in Figure 2.8. This graph has disconnected parts due
to the nature of our linear sweep approach. Linear sweep continues disassembling
until it cannot properly disassemble; this results in segments of code that may never
be reached by the main method of our binary during static analysis. Often when
beginning disassembly; the entry point of our program may not be at the lowest
point in memory, as most sections of code are not all sequential, which can cause us
to miss sections of code earlier in the program.
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3.0.3 Graph Embedding Generation
Once the CFGs (Figure 2.8) have been generated, we can begin applying specific
graph embedding algorithms to them. Current embeddings algorithms accept an
edge adjacency list which simply defines a node and its edges. Once we have the
complete adjacency list we can begin feeding our input to the HOPE embedding and
Node2Vec algorithms, saving each embedding in a its own file. For both embedding
algorithms, we determined that the resulting embedding’s dimensions should be of
three dimensions. The embedding size was chosen to preserve as much information
as possible without the resulting feature set being too large. Our chosen size of
three dimensional embeddings allows us to effectively create large embeddings without
requiring too much time to generate. A large part of embedding information is the
trade off of information, as the operation of embedding can lose information.
The HOPE algorithm attempts to preserve higher-order proximity within graphs
(Ou et al. 2016). Higher-order refers to the number of neighbors or vertices that are
taken into account when developing the embedding. The HOPE algorithm takes this
embedding one step further by producing an approximation method for developing
a higher-order embedding, allowing us to use much larger graphs with the HOPE
algorithm. The benefit of this is that when handling large graphs we can approximate
an embedding, allowing us to develop models for learning and by extracting embedded
features and derive the general structure from it (Goyal and Ferrara 2017).
To add some comparison for our embeddings we chose the Node2Vec algorithm to
develop further embeddings for our approach. Node2Vec takes a biased random walk
of our graph to develop low dimensional embeddings. Unlike HOPE, Node2Vec does
not look at preserving higher-order proximity, but instead the general neighborhood
in the graph. What this means is that it is unlikely to visit the same nodes in the
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graph in the same order on subsequent runs, thus the biased nature of Node2Vec. The
resulting embeddings from Node2Vec will have a high guarantee that all nodes in the
graph have been visited but unlikely in the same order, resulting in minor changes to
the embeddings.
3.0.4 Padding
Graph embedding algorithms produce embeddings with lengths dependant on the
original graph structure. Our approach generates embeddings that are three dimen-
sionsal. However, to effectively classify our data using machine learning many meth-
ods require that the information be coerced into a one-dimensional equivalent length
format. Thus, in addition to truncating or adding padding, we must also flatten the
graph embedding into a single array of values.
Padding can be an issue as artificially adding padding to our data could skew
resulting data later in our experiments. To resolve this issue we apply zero padding
to all embeddings to make them equivalent length. Zero in both HOPE and Node2Vec
represent a lack of connection between nodes in the embedding. Thus any zeroes we
add as padding will not affect the meaning of the embeddings.
Flattening of the resulting embedding is also important as most machine learning
approaches require that all data is of a single dimension. For our purposes, we use
column-wise flattening to retain the nodes vector representation in an embedding.
Column-wise flattening is a simple method to preserve the multidimensional data in
order. To flatten, we simply read, starting from the top of the column down, into a
single array. This also helps to prevent data being skewed from any padding applied
to the embeddings. In addition with skew prevention, there is the added benefit
of being able to distinguish entire nodes from any given point selected during our
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Figure 3.4: Columnwise flattening of N-dimensional graph and M-dimensional em-
bedding allows us to preserve a given nodes embedding in the flattened array allowing
an analyst the ability to extract the whole node embedding given one point.
machine learning process. Since the nodes will exist as immediate neighbors in the
single dimensional array, we can do simple math, using the length of all embeddings
plus their three dimensional size, to extract the individual node’s embedding from the
array. The ability to do so is important for future work as we can then recreate the
generic graph structure using the embeddings and potentially distinguish structures
that may be used for further classification.
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3.0.5 Machine Learning
This research is, in effect, a unique effort in the realm of utilizing graph embed-
dings for the task of classification on variable length graphs. Thus, many of the
methods are used purely as exploratory efforts to distinguish valuable results from
pure noise. As mentioned above, we use our dataset of real-world binaries taken from
Unix repositories in order to train our models. For training and testing sets, we per-
form 10-fold cross-validation on our dataset, allowing us reasonable results from our
models.
Our current methods for modeling our dataset focus on decision tree classification
algorithms. This is an important part of the process as we would like to be able to
distinguish the specific extracted information that may represent a specific compiler
provenance feature. Decision tree classifiers allow us to see what features may be
used to manually extract the features, further allowing us to verify and develop even
more features. One such purpose of this is to extract the graph embedding of a node,
identify it in the embedding graph, derive the original graph from the embedding,
and then identify the structure which the node belong to. Our current approach only
applies simple classification methods, future work may use alternative classification
methods.
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4 Results
4.0.1 Data Generation
There has been little investigation into Compiler Provenance and as such, there
exist no datasets that fit our needs. Datasets are an important part of applying
machine learning to a problem as any solution you come to will be a result of the
data. As we intend for this method to work in the real world it is important that
the data we use is representative. Thus, it was crucial for us to develop a dataset
that was easily reproducible and included large numbers of binaries for analysis. For
this task, Gentoo, a distribution of Linux, was used in order to automate the binary
generation. Unlike other Linux distributions, Gentoo builds all packages from source
at installation time. Gentoo allows us to specify a compiler and optimization flags
for package building, allowing us to build a large number of binaries with different
compilers and flags. Gentoo enables one to generate large binaries that are more
representative of applications you would find in the real world. Our final dataset is
comprised of roughly 200 programs compiled using the various versions, optimizations,
and compilers resulting in a total of 1,700 binaries.
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1 COPY −−from=gentoo / portage : l a t e s t / usr / portage / usr / portage
2 RUN emerge −−autounmask−wr i t e −v =sys−deve l /gcc−5∗ | | t rue
3 RUN etc−update −−automode −5
4 RUN echo CFLAGS=\”−march=nat ive −O2 −pipe −mno−avx\” > / e tc /
portage /make . conf
5 RUN FEATURES=’−sandbox −userdsandbox ’ emerge −−autounmask−wr i t e =
sys−deve l /gcc−5∗
6 ENTRYPOINT [ ”/ bin /bash” , ”/tmp/ gather . sh” , ”gcc −5.4 .0 ” , ”g++−5.4.0
” ]
7 CMD [ ]
Figure 4.1: Dockerfile
The instructions above are the full dockerfile that is used for generating our binaries for
analysis.
1 CC=gcc
2 CXX=g++
3 CFLAGS=”−march=nat ive −O2 −pipe ”
4 CXXFLAGS=”${CFLAGS}”
5 CHOST=” x86 64−pc−l inux−gnu”
6 MAKEOPTS=”−j 5 ”
7 ABI X86=”32 64”
8
9 CPU FLAGS X86=” aes avx avx2 fma3 mmx mmxext popcnt s s e s s e2
s s e3 s s e 4 1 s s e 4 2 s s s e 3 ”
10 USE=”mmx mmxext s s e s s e2 s s s e 3 s s e 4 1 s s e 4 2 avx 3dnow \
11 apng jpeg g i f t i f f png svg xmp \
12 f l a c mp3 ogg opus vo rb i s pu l seaud io \
13 rtmp webp xvid x264 vaapi glamor \
14 i cu c o r e f o n t s t ruetype c jk \
15 c a i r o i cu min iz ip opengl xcb l i b i n p u t qml wayland xwayland
g l e s qt5 \
16 cryptsetup gcrypt gudev −kdbus kerne l−b u i l t i n l z 4 ip route2
gpg systemd \
17 cont r ib ex t en s i on s nsp lug in bash−complet ion secure−d e l e t e
b luetooth \
18 −f irmware−l oade r −tcpd −webkit ”
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20 GENTOO MIRRORS=” http :// gentoo . o s u o s l . org / http ://www. g t l i b .
gatech . edu/pub/ gentoo http :// d i s t f i l e s . gentoo . org /”
21 . . .
Figure 4.2: make.conf
Gentoo allows for many configurable options. The above highlights a few of the options a
user can configure to tailor their operating system to their specifications. To specify the
compiler and flags one only need change options: CC, CXX, CFLAGS, CXXFLAGS
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Compiler Version Optimization
gcc 4.9 O0,O1,O2,O3,Wall
gcc 5.4 O0,O1,O2,O3,Wall
gcc 7.0 O0,O1,O2,O3,Wall
clang 4 O0,O1,O2,O3,Wall
clang 5 O0,O1,O2,O3,Wall
clang 6 O0,O1,O2,O3,Wall
Table 4.1: The compilers, their versions, and the optimizations applied for the binaries
in our project.
4.0.2 Evaluation
To evaluate our classification model we approached the problem in two ways:
Tiered, Non-Tiered. Tiered classifies data assuming some information is known ahead
of time, such as compiler and version information. Non-Tiered is classification assum-
ing no information is known ahead of time. In addition to these approaches, we apply
both a Tiered and Non-Tiered approach to the following algorithms Node2Vec and
HOPE. HOPE is the factorization based graph embedding algorithm. Node2Vec is
the random walk based algorithm, and is used as a direct comparison for HOPE in
these approaches. Finally, we apply both a Tiered and Non-Tiered approach along-
side an Average Size Padding method which uses the HOPE algorithm and seeks to
reduce the embeddings overall size by imposing a hard limit on the embedding length.
Compiler Accuracy
gcc 80%
clang 85%
Table 4.2: Classification of the Compilers using HOPE Embeddings with a Tiered
approach. There is a 50% chance of classifying correctly through random chance;
better than 50% indicates that the method is successful.
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Compiler Version Accuracy
gcc 4.9 63%
gcc 5.4 70%
gcc 7.0 96%
clang 4 64%
clang 5 64%
clang 6 64%
Table 4.3: Classification of the Version assuming known Compiler using HOPE Em-
beddings with a Tiered approach. (33% random chance of correct classification.)
Compiler Version O0 O1 O2 O3 Wall
gcc 4.9 24.1% 80% 35% 7% 56.7%
gcc 5.4 29% 44.4% 80% 30% 37%
gcc 7.0 48.6% 42.5% 32.5% 8% 53.3%
clang 4 55.6% 57.4% 31.5% 32.7% 46.7%
clang 5 48.1% 59.3% 22% 28.3% 46.7%
clang 6 25.9% 46.3% 46.3% 32.1% 33.3%
Table 4.4: Classification of the Optimizations assuming known Compiler and Version
using HOPE Embeddings with a Tiered approach. (20% random chance of correct
classification.)
Compiler Version Accuracy
gcc 4.9 56%
gcc 5.4 60%
gcc 7.0 94%
clang 4 56%
clang 5 58%
clang 6 62%
Table 4.5: Classification of Compiler and Version using HOPE Embeddings with a
Non-Tiered approach. (15% random chance of correct classification.)
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Figure 4.3: This is the visualization of the data shown in Table 4.4. Each column is
the optimization applied, each symbol-color combination represents a compiler and
version. (20% random chance of correct classification.)
Compiler Version O0 O1 O2 O3 Wall
gcc 4.9 13% 52% 24% 3% 56.7%
gcc 5.4 29% 44.4% 26% 23.5% 26.7%
gcc 7.0 43% 37.5% 17.5% 16.7% 36.7%
clang 4 35% 37% 25.9% 40% 53.3%
clang 5 18.5% 46.3% 20% 27% 30%
clang 6 16.7% 37% 33.3% 24.5% 36.7%
Table 4.6: Classification of Compiler and Version and Optimization using HOPE Em-
beddings with a Non-Tiered approach. (3% random chance of correct classification.)
Compiler Accuracy
gcc 55%
clang 93%
Table 4.7: Classification of Compilers using HOPE alongside Average Length Padding
in a Tiered approach. (50% random chance of correct classification.)
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Figure 4.4: Visualization of the data shown in Table 4.6. Each symbol corresponds
to a compiler and version and the accuracy predicting the flags used for compilation.
(3% random chance of correct classification.)
Compiler Version Accuracy
gcc 4.9 56%
gcc 5.4 70%
gcc 7.0 28%
clang 4 52%
clang 5 55%
clang 6 61%
Table 4.8: Classification of Version knowing Compiler using HOPE Embeddings
alongside Average Length Padding with a Tiered approach. (33% random chance
of correct classification.)
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Compiler Version O0 O1 O2 O3 Wall
gcc 4.9 63% 25% 37% 33% 5%
gcc 5.4 43% 25% 42% 13% 13%
gcc 7.0 46% 48% 37% 17% 11%
clang 4 37% 20% 35% 33% 40%
clang 5 27% 9% 50% 26% 43%
clang 6 43% 18% 43% 32% 30%
Table 4.9: Classification of Compiler, Version and Optimizations using HOPE Embed-
dings alongside Average Length Padding with a Non-Tiered approach. (3% random
chance of correct classification.)
Figure 4.5: Visualization of the data shown in Table 4.9. Each symbol corresponds
to a compiler and version and the accuracy predicting the flags used for compilation.
(3% random chance of correct classification.)
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Compiler Version O0 O1 O2 O3 Wall
gcc 4.9 48% 35% 35% 35% 0%
gcc 5.4 23% 48% 7% 36% 0%
gcc 7.0 26% 20% 35% 25% 52%
clang 4 29% 38% 13% 16% 0%
clang 5 30% 25% 29% 33% 20%
clang 6 35% 38% 20% 38% 17%
Table 4.10: Classification of Compiler, Version and Optimizations using Node2Vec
Embeddings with a Non-Tiered approach. (3% random chance of correct classifica-
tion.)
Figure 4.6: Visualization of the data shown in Table 4.10. Each symbol corresponds
to a compiler and version and the accuracy predicting the flags used for compilation.
(3% random chance of correct classification.)
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Figure 4.7: Boxplots displaying the accuracy of each approach for each flag. Red
shows tiered accuracy. Blue shows the Non-tiered accuracy. Purple highlights the
average padding approach accuracy. Green displays the accuracy using Node2Vec
embeddings. Diamonds indicate outliers. The random chance of success for Tiered
was 20%, while for all other methods it was 3%.
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4.0.3 Limitations
Our experiments suffer from a few limitations, related largely to the implemen-
tation and dataset generation. First, all resulting CFGs stem from the disassembly
methods described in our implementation. The current disassembly method used is
a simple linear method, which has the potential to miss large segments of binary.
Linear disassembly can give us a rough structure of the CFG for a given binary. Un-
fortunately, as linear disassembly only runs once through the disassembly, it often
produces large, disconnected segments of nodes. Thus, any embeddings developed
from the disconnected graphs are a reflection of this approach.
Furthermore, our decision to use a linear disassembly method was aided by x86’s
consistency with realigning itself as machine code is generated. Linear disassembly
continuously disassembles any binary data it sees until it encounters invalid binary
data. The linear approach may become offset from the intended binary data cre-
ating an entirely fictional graph representation of the binary data, however, due to
x86s propensity to realign itself we are less likely to generate completely fictional
representations.
Lastly, graph embeddings result in multidimensional data, which is made into a
one dimensional array in our approach and then padded to make all embeddings an
equivalent length for our machine learning method. Making the data into a one-
dimensional form is important for our machine learning model as multi-dimensional
data is a much larger problem for classification. This padding and flattening loses
both data and may insert some bias into our dataset, and it would be worth exploring
more in future work.
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4.0.4 Discussion
Our results indicate that the utilization of graph embeddings for compiler prove-
nance feature extraction has potential. Classification was done using four different
approaches: tiered, non-tiered, average padding, Node2Vec. In our tiered approach,
the HOPE embedding algorithm was used with the assumption that some infor-
mation is known beforehand such as the compiler or version. Table 4.2 shows our
method distinguishes between our two compilers with relatively high accuracy. Fur-
ther distinguishing between versions as in Table 4.3 again shows us that the model
can distinguish between the versions with some confidence. Lastly, given compiler
and version, the model can distinguish between most of the optimization levels with
improved accuracy, better than chance, however, optimization level three drops below
even random chance (discussed below). For the non-tiered approach, no prior knowl-
edge is assumed. Again, using the HOPE algorithm, all predictions are the same or
significantly higher than random chance. Average Padding is an alternative method
for dealing with the variable length embeddings. By collecting the embeddings for all
binaries and determining the average length we cut off those embeddings which are
longer and pad those that are smaller, which resulted in tighter variance for overall
accuracy. Finally, Node2Vec was used as a single alternative to the HOPE embedding
to present the effectiveness of random walk based graph embedding methods. The
random walk method resulted in positive results, however, was much more variable
and had subpar accuracy when it came to Wall optimizations.
When comparing the results for each compiler it is important to note the differ-
ences between the compilers, versions, and flags used for compilation. Our hypothesis
was that the underlying structure of the CFGs for the various compilers was different
enough that there was information we could extract to distinguish between them.
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The results do indicate that the underlying structure produced by each compiler is
different enough to distinguish between the two compilers in the dataset with rela-
tively high confidence. This is understandable, given that compiler, such as clang
and gcc are implemented differently and are optimized in different ways. Their im-
plementation in regards to branching structures, symbol tables, libraries, and data
structures will all affect the output CFG that we use as the first step in our approach.
Version information becomes slightly more difficult due to the slight optimizations
that may have been made from one version to the next. Major version numbers
indicate that there were significant changes in the implementation. Our hypothesis
is that the new features added to each major version would create new structures
that could allow us to distinguish between major versions. Our results support this
hypothesis. Table 4.3 shows that the accuracy for, gcc with the tiered approach, is
much higher than clang. This larger variation in version accuracy for gcc may be
partly related to the version jump from 5.4 to 7.0, which may contain more features
and give a better detection for gcc 7.0.
Finally, distinguishing between flags used for compilation can be extremely diffi-
cult, due to the effects they have on the resulting machine code. Some flags such as
the debug flag result in no distinguishable difference during CFG generation, making
it impossible to extract. Optimization flags are thus the most important flags to fo-
cus on due to their underlying effects of the machine code output. Each optimization
level results in different translations being made from source to machine code, with
optimization level zero (“O0”) resulting in no translation taking place. Often opti-
mization level two (“O2”) is used for packages with optimization level three (“O3”)
rarely being used due to it increasing the size of the binary and, potentially, its run-
time. “Wall” is not considered an optimization flag however, it enables many features
such as bounds checking to add more logic to be applied during the source to machine
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code translation. Results from Tables (4.4, 4.6, 4.10, 4.9) indicate that these flags
impart some additional graph features that this approach can use for compiler prove-
nance detection. Comparing tiered vs non-tiered approaches enabled us to investigate
which features our model may be more able to detect and extract.
Tiered and non-tiered approaches are noticeably ineffective at predicting the “O3”
optimization level. Optimizations applied at this level include all optimizations done
by “O2”, are generally more expensive, and include other techniques, such as: func-
tion inlining, loop unrolling, and vectorization. Function inlining replaces the called
function with the body of the called function, eliminating the overhead of calling a
new function. Loops are conditional repeated operations such as a for loop and are
normally represented as three separate blocks in a CFG: one for the condition, one
for the operations to be done, one for exit. Loop unrolling removes the conditional
portion of the loop and unpacks the loop into one block, which reduces the number
of features that may be represented in the CFG. Vectorization takes advantage of
compiler specific functions that are separate from user or library code, which make
certain operations much faster. These optimizations can have a significant effect on
a program’s machine code and the time it takes for a binary to be generated. It is
possible that due to our simple linear disassembly we miss potentially vectorized oper-
ations, because vectorization requires that disassembly occurs in sections of memory
not included in our initial linear sweep. Additionally, our method might miss some of
the inlined code due to our simple disassembly method. In a completely perfect CFG
one would see interconnecting branches from function call to the functions intercon-
necting nodes, however with our approach if a function is called the node may not
show a connection. Thus it is completely possible to miss function inlining without
a more effective disassembly method. Furthermore, as optimizations in “O3” may
be excluded during compilation due to errors, memory issues, or other factors, the
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resulting machine code may be extremely similar to optimization level “O2” causing
low prediction accuracy..
Conversely, Node2Vec and Average Length Padding approaches seem to struggle
less with optimization level “O3” while completely missing, as in Node2Vec, accu-
racy for optimization level “Wall”. The “Wall” flag is meant to add bounds check-
ing and other security measures that aren’t included by default during compilation.
Node2Vec’s random walk approach can be ideal for networks with many neighbors,
however, the effect of this approach on a directed graph such as the developed CFGs
may be ineffective due to the extremely low amount of neighbors each node may have.
Most notably, as bounds checking is implemented by “Wall” optimization flag, the
resulting CFG may simply may not be that different from the other optimization
levels if there is no bounds checking required by the original source code. The biased
random walk that is used with Node2Vec may develop embeddings that do not accu-
rately portray the CFGs in which bounds checking is implemented, this could result
in highly variant predictions as seen in Table 4.10.
Average Length Padding suffers from the same missing embedding issue that
Node2Vec suffers from, due to the cutoff that may be applied to each embedding.
This often results in large removed graph segments across all embeddings. Overall,
Average Length Padding may be more useful if applied along with a preprocessing
step to select potential nodes in a graph as an alternative to using it as a cutoff due
to missing data. Node2Vec is something that may be more useful given potentially
larger CFGs with more information contained in each node.
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5 Conclusions
5.0.1 Future Works
This work highlights the novel use of graph embeddings for binary analysis and
compiler provenance detection. Future work may focus on disassembly, applying more
advanced linear, predictive, and recursive techniques on binaries. Further analysis of
graph embedding techniques for their applicability in the field of binary analysis is
another step for future work. There are many graph embedding techniques, and look-
ing for those that scale well and other features. Finally reconstructing the graphical
structure from the important features extracted from our approach. A key feature of
the GEM framework was analysing their reproduction of the graphical structure after
embedding (Goyal and Ferrara 2017). This reproduction would be the next logical
step after feature extraction, recreating the structures that are represented in the
embedding and are thus indicative of the compiler provenance features.
CFG generation is a pivotal step in our approach for compiler provenance detec-
tion. All data is derived from this step and requires that it accurately represents
the application itself. Future work may focus on implementing a more verbose and
effective approach for CFG generation. The current approach outlined in this paper
uses a linear sweep for disassembly in order to generate the CFGs, however, as men-
tioned above a linear sweep suffers from offset issues and missing segments of machine
code. Further complicating the process is that using a recursive approach can suffer
from obfuscation and inefficient disassembly times. Developing a hybrid approach
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that can accurately disassemble a given binary without inferring anything from the
applications metadata is a critical future step.
Along with CFG generation is the issue of embeddings, padding, and classifica-
tion. Embeddings themselves are a result of the graph that is being embedded, as
such every embedding will be of different sizes given the graph it is working with. In
our real world setting we operate assuming that all binaries are different, thus the
necessity for padding embeddings to equal length as outlined above. However, future
work may focus on a few aspects of this problem. First, the issue of dissimilar embed-
dings. A potential avenue for future research may develop an approach that extracts
similar structures within a CFG such that the resultant embedding is of similar length
to others which may then be used for classification. Second, the issue of padding.
Currently our approach assumes the padding does not impact the embedding in any
way, future work may look at other forms of padding such as: adding nodes to the
graph prior to embedding and different values for embedding. Last, the classification
of these embeddings. As machine learning requires that all labels be consistent across
samples. Our approach made the assumption that the labels would remain consistent
for each. Future work may focus on developing a scheme such that the resultant
embeddings remain provably consistent when doing classification.
Finally utilization of embeddings for classification require much more research.
Our current approach discusses embeddings for use only in relation to simple decision
tree and random forest classification. Both these are relatively simple methods of
classification and leave much to be desired in regards to efficacy and optimization.
Future work may look at using neural networks and deep learning methods, which are
much more effective with variable length input, for compiler provinence idenfication
and classification.
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5.0.2 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a novel technique for detecting and recovering the
compiler provenance features of a binary using simple disassembly techniques coupled
with graphical embeddings and machine learning. This approach is novel in its use of
graph embeddings for machine learning, allowing us to highlight its applicability in the
field of reverse engineering. Our results show that these features show promise in their
ability to help distinguish between compiler versions, flags, and optimization levels
when applied in a tiered or non-tiered manner. Furthermore, our results indicate that
alternative graph embeddings also have the potential for use in compiler provenance
identification. Most importantly our results show that with more refinement and
resources this could be useful in the field of reverse engineering and binary analysis.
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